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I. INTRODUCTION
This case study is based on the concepts and
methodology presented in The Fundamentals of Aircraft
Combat Survivability Analysis and Design [Ref.l], by Dr
Robert E. Ball, Professor of Aeronautics at the Naval
Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, California. As
stated in Dr Ball's book, "The cost of modern aircraft
weapon systems, coupled with the requirement that the
system be effective, makes imperative the consideration of
the aircraft's survivability throughout the life cycle of
the system." The requirement for consideration of
survivability throughout the life cycle, expressly implies
the requirement for a comprehensive survivability program
from day one of the conceptual/preliminary design phase.
In order for this to happen, aircraft designers and others
involved with the design and development of an aircraft
must be made aware of the ways to enhance survivability and
the methodology for assessing it. This case study was
developed to give these people an example of the first step
of a survivability program, namely a vulnerability study.
The study is performed on a generic aircraft of the
author's own design in order to eliminate any problem of
classification. This aircraft was designed to fulfill the
requirements of AE4306 "Helicopter Design", taught by Prof.
Donald Layton. This course is based on a helicopter design
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manual written by Prof. Layton [Ref. 2] which provides the
historical data and corporate knowledge by which most
helicopters are designed today. Helicopter conceptual
design is far less definitive than the fixed wing design
procedure, therefore performance specifications are
generally all that are supplied, with just about everything
else left to the imagination of the designer.
This study attempts a single hit vulnerability
assessment of a combat helicopter. It is intended as a
learning experience for the reader. Therefore, in the
interest of accuracy, most if not all of the background
information which is required in order to fully understand
the case study was paraphrased and in some cases copied
directly from one of three references. This is especially
true in Chapter II where most of the groundwork is laid.
The first reference is listed above as Dr Ball's book. The
second is an excellent case study of a fixed wing attack
aircraft by Lt Robert Novak [Ref. 3] and the third
reference is the DOD MIL STD 2 069 [Ref. 4] which provides
the requirements and guidelines for establishing and
conducting aircraft survivability programs. It is not this
author's intention to take credit in any way for
information derived from these three references, only to
use the information as a basis on which to build the bulk
of this case study.
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II. GENERAL SURVIVABILITY PROGRAM OVERVIEW
Aircraft combat survivability is defined as "the
capability of an aircraft to avoid and/or withstand a man
made hostile environment." In an effort to understand and
quantify survivability it is divided into two categories,
vulnerability , defined as an aircraft's inability to remain
under controlled flight given that it is hit by some damage
mechanism and susceptibility , defined as the inability of
an aircraft to avoid being damaged in the pursuit of its
mission. By definition vulnerability is something that is
designed into the aircraft and remains with the aircraft
regardless of location whereas susceptibility is dependent
on a variety of outside factors such as the physical
environment and the threat environment. These major
concepts are depicted in Figure 2 . 1
.
[Ref . 1 :p2
]
A complete survivability program must include all the
factors that affect the aircraft's susceptibility and its
vulnerability. The tasks of a complete survivability
program are defined in MIL-STD-2069 . These include:






















Figure 2.1 Major Concepts of Aircraft Survivability
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The general flow of these tasks is depicted in Figure 2.2.
[Ref.l:p9] Each of the above tasks will be explained in
more complete detail in the following paragraphs.
A. MISSION THREAT ANALYSIS
The ground work for deciding what is required for an
aircraft on the drawing board is deciding first what will
be required of that aircraft in combat. Specifically this
includes defining each operational mode of the aircraft
required by the specific mission. Aircraft configuration,
operating conditions/environmental factors, ordnance
loading, tactics, aircraft performance characteristics all
define the operational mode. Secondly, the expected
threats to be encountered must be listed, as well as the
characteristics of the individual threat systems. Future
threat systems must also be considered. Finally, the first
two steps are combined to arrive at the encounter
conditions. These encounter conditions are then used as a
basis for the vulnerability and susceptibility assessments
and the trade-off studies. [Ref. I:pll5]
A mission threat analysis can be broken down into three
distinct areas. The first of these would be the aircraft
theaters of operation and types of missions, and the flight
and operating conditions, including airspeeds, altitudes,
configurations, and types of electromagnetic radiation, for
each mission type.
14
Figure 2.2 Survivability Element Flow
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Second is the definition of the threat environment.
Included in this definition are the operating conditions
and threat envelopes for all weapon systems that one can
expect to encounter for each mission and theater. The last
of these areas involves evaluating the information gleaned
from the other two areas in order to determine the
likelihood and conditions of any encounter with hostile
fire.
B. AIRCRAFT DESCRIPTION
Vulnerability and susceptibility assessments require
that an aircraft description be available. As much
technical and functional data as possible must be
assembled if these assessments are to be accurate. This
description must include general characteristics, such as
whether the aircraft is fixed or rotary wing, and more
specific information, such as a geometric description and
performance parameters, and complete system descriptions of
the important systems, such as structural, propulsion,
power train and rotor blade, flight control, fuel, crew and
armament.
C. VULNERABILITY PROGRAM
As stated earlier, the vulnerability of an aircraft is
a measure of that aircraft's inability to maintain
controlled flight given that it is hit be some damage
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mechanism. Failing this, the designers' objective should be
a graceful degradation in system performance to allow for a
successful egress, first from the hostile environment and
then from the aircraft. In other words, the more vulnerable
the aircraft is, the easier it is to kill when hit. A
complete vulnerability analysis is made up of several
components. The first of these is the identification of the
aircraft's critical components followed by a vulnerability
assessment, and finally recommendations on how to reduce
the vulnerability of the aircraft.
A critical component is defined as any component whose
loss or damage would lead to an aircraft kill. Therefore,
it is essential that all critical components in an aircraft
be identified. This identification is performed in a
process referred to as the critical component analysis. A
general procedure for determining these critical components
as is (1) a selection of the aircraft kill levels or
categories to be considered, (2) an assembly of the
technical and functional description of the aircraft and
(3) the determination of the critical components of the
aircraft and their damage caused failure modes for the
selected kill levels.
Kill categories measure the seriousness of aircraft
damage, as well as how graceful the degradation of system
operation is. They are divided into an attrition kill, a
mission abort kill, and a forced landing kill. An attrition
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kill can be further divided into levels; (1) KK kill in
which the aircraft is destroyed immediately after being
hit, (2) K kill in which the aircraft falls out of manned
control within 30 seconds after being hit, (3) A kill in
which the aircraft departs from manned control within 5
minutes after being hit, and finally (4) B kill in which
the aircraft falls out of manned control within 30 minutes
after being hit. The forced landing kill is especially
applicable to this case study as it pertains to helicopter
aviation. This category includes any forced landing after
being hit but prior to the time fuel is exhausted.
Determination of the critical components of the
aircraft and their damage-caused failure modes for the
selected kill levels is done by first identifying the
flight and mission essential functions an aircraft must
perform. An example of this can be seen in Figure
2 . 3
.
[Ref . I:pl39] From this list, the systems and
subsystems which perform the essential functions are
identified and used to conduct a Failure Mode and Effects
Analysis (FMEA) . This analysis is a "bottom up" approach
which first identifies and documents all possible failure
modes of critical systems, subsystems and their components
and then_ determines the effect of these failures upon the
flight and mission essential functions. This particular
approach is often used by safety analysts and safety
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Figure 2.4 Example FMEA Format
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[Ref.l:pl42] Following the FMEA, a Damage Mode and Effects
Analysis (DMEA) is performed to relate system or subsystem
component failures to combat inflicted damage. Figure 2.5
[Ref.l:pl4 3] shows an example DMEA matrix and Table 2.1
[Ref.l:pl45] lists the major damage-caused kill modes for
the primary aircraft systems. A combination of an FMEA and
a DMEA is often called a Failure Mode, Effects and
Criticality Analysis, or FMECA.
Although not required by MIL STD 2069, critical
components can be identified using a Fault Tree Analysis
(FTA) . This "top down approach", in contrast to the FMEA,
uses logic symbology to determine what sequence of events
or singular events will lead to an undesired event. This
technique is illustrated in Figure 2 . 6. [Ref . I:pl49]
Once the critical components are identified, they can
be represented in a clear, concise manner referred to as a
kill tree. This "tree", shown in Figure 2.7, [Ref . I:pl53]
identifies redundant and nonredundant critical components
by their location on the tree. A complete cut through the
trunk of the tree is required to kill the aircraft.
Similarly this relationship can be represented in a logical
kill expression.
The second step in a complete vulnerability analysis is
referred to as a vulnerability assessment. This assessment
is a process by which numerical values of the aircraft's
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Figure 2.6 Generic Fault Tree Diagram
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Figure 2.7 Example Kill Diagram
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out at various levels of detail. Specifically these levels
are estimates, evaluations and analyses in increasing order
of complexity and detail. Four specific measures of
vulnerability are available for use. These are P^/Tr, Kj,
PK/D' PL/0* PK/H^"S ^e conditional probability that an
aircraft will be killed given a random hit by a damage
mechanism. P^. is defined as the aircraft's vulnerable
area, a theoretical, nonunique area presented to the threat
that, if hit be a damage mechanism, would result in an
aircraft kill. P-.._is the conditional probability of an
aircraft kill given the nearby detonation of an HE warhead.
PL/0 is the probability of kill given a lock on by laser
weaponry.
The threats and damage mechanisms that are usually
considered in the assessment are: (1) a nonexplosive
penetrating projectile or fragment, (2) the fragments and
blast from a internally detonating warhead, (3) external
blast, (4) the fragments, penetrators, and missile debris
from externally detonating warheads, and (5) the laser.
The damage or kill criteria for each of the failure modes
of each critical components must be determined for these
threats. The four criteria in use today are (1) the PK/H
function, (2) the area removal criterion, (3) the energy
density criterion and (4) the blast damage mechanism.
These four criteria are explained in detail in Reference 1.
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Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly in a
vulnerability program, is the concept of vulnerability
reduction. This reduction is a conscious effort to reduce
whatever measure of vulnerability is used in the assessment
of the aircraft. This reduction is achieved through the
combination or selective use of six specific vulnerability
reduction concepts. These concepts are (1) component
redundancy, (2) component location, (3) passive damage
suppression, (4) active damage suppression, (5) component
shielding and (6) component elimination.
D. SUSCEPTIBILITY PROGRAM
Once again, susceptibility refers to the inability of
an aircraft to avoid being hit while operating within a man
made hostile environment. Susceptibility is,
therefore, dependent on the environment, the threat and the
aircraft itself. In a manner very similar to that of the
vulnerability program, a susceptibility program is
subdivided into three major tasks. First is an essential
elements analysis (EEA) , followed by a susceptibility
assessment, and finally recommendations for reducing the
susceptibility of the aircraft.
The essential elements analysis parallels the
identification of the critical components in the
vulnerability program when an FTA is utilized. It is a
timewise sequence or chain of events which leads to the
27
final undesired event in much the same manner as a FTA. An
example EEA is provided in Figure 2.8. [Ref. I:p226]
The susceptibility assessment is an effort to quantify
the susceptibility of an aircraft. In this assessment,
each important event and element, such as radar signature
of the helicopter, the radar detection of the helicopter,
the effectiveness of the chaff in decoying the radar
tracker, and the effects of the helicopter maneuvers are
modelled, and numerical values are determined for the model
parameters.
The final section of the susceptibility program
outlines the six susceptibility reduction concepts. The
concepts are: (1) threat warning, (2) noise jammers and
deceivers, (3) signature reduction, (4) expendables, (5)
threat suppression and (6) tactics. These concepts must be
evaluated and trade-off studies conducted to determine the
consequences, both pro and con, of their incorporation.
For example, what effect would the added weight and cost of
a jammer have on the overall aircraft weight, and therefore
aircraft performance and overall cost.
E. SURVIVABILITY ASSESSMENT
The survivability assessment is the culmination of the
combined vulnerability and susceptibility assessments. It
combines good engineering judgement with a sound
understanding of the proposed tactics and methods of
28
Events and Elements EE? Questions
1. Bldit and fragments strike (be
A/C.
Yes
2. Missile warhead detonates
within lethal range.
Yes
3. Radar proximity fuze detects
A/C.
Yes
4. Missile propelled and guided
to vicinity of A/C.
Yes
5. Missile guidance system
functions in flight.
Yes
6. Missile motor ignites. Yes
7. Missile guidance system
locked on to target's engine
i.r. radiation.
Yes
8. Target's engines within
missile's ncld of view.
Yes
9. Enemy tighter maneuvers to put
target into field of view and
within maximum range.
Yes









Enemy fighter given steering
by ground control intercept
(CiCl) net to acquire target.
Target A/C designated to enemy
fighter and fighler launched.
Fighter available to launch
against target.
Enemy C J net functions
properly.




Early warning net detects and
establishes track (course and









How many fragments hit (he A/C and
where do they rut?
Can the onboard ECM suite inhibi(
the functioning of (he proximity
fuze?
Will chaff decov (he fuze?
Can (he (argc( A/C ouimaneuver (he
missile?
Are i.r. flares effective decoys?
Arc i.r. flares cflccuve decovs?
Arc i.r. flares effective decoys?
Is (he engine's i.r. suppressor
effecdve in preventing lock-on?
Are (he engine ho( pans shielded?
Does (he enemy righicr have a
performance edge?
Does (he (argct A/C have an
offensive capabilny agains( (he
enemy fighler?
Does (he onboard ECM suite inhibit
acquisition by ihc lighter's
radar?
Do (he (actics place the target
outside sensor limits?
Is the camouflage paint scheme
effective againsi visual
acquisition?
Does the onboard or siand-off ECM
sunc have a communications
lamming capability?
Is a fighler escort available1
Does the onboard or stand-off ECM
suite have a communications
jamming capabilny?
Are (here anv suppordng forces to
destrov the enemy fighter on the
ground?
Does the s(and-off ECM sukc have a
commumcadons lamming capability 7
Is (he iargc( A/C easily
detected and (racked by radar?
Is the stand-off ECM suite
effective against search radars?
Does the stand-off ECM suite
have IFFN counicrmcasures?
Is the target A/C casilv detected
and tracked by radar?
Is (he s(and-off ECM suiie
effective againsi search radars?
Figure 2.8 Example EEA Summary
29
aircraft employment. Numerous trade-off studies are
required in order to obtain the highest survival rate while
still performing the mission for which it was designed.
Obviously, the most survivable aircraft in the world is the
one sitting in the hangar far from combat. This is not the
goal of any survivability program. In fact, as stated by
Dr. Ball, "the goal of the aircraft combat survivability
(ACS) discipline is the early identification and successful
incorporation of those specific survivability enhancement
features that increase the effectiveness of the weapon
system.
"
In summary this chapter has attempted a very basic
summary of a growing discipline. It by no means even
scratches the surface of very complex topic. The following
chapters begin the actual case study and are an attempt to
scratch the surface in meaningful way.
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III. THE AIRCRAFT
The aircraft used for this case study was designed to
be a generic lightweight combat helicopter. The
reguirements for the design were as follows:
A. SUMMARY OF DESIGN REQUIREMENTS
-TYPE Light/Medium attack
helicopter, land based
-PRIMARY MISSION Air-to-Ground fire
support while operating
within four miles of the




-MAXIMUM GROSS WEIGHT 8 000+500 pounds
-USEFUL LOAD (excluding fuel) 150 pounds
-MAXIMUM RANGE 250 nmi/4 57.2 km
-MAXIMUM RATE OF CLIMB 2500 fpm
-MAXIMUM FUSELAGE LENGTH 50 ft
-MAXIMUM ROTOR RADIUS 27 ft
-SERVICE CEILING 14500 ft
-HOVER IGE 8000 ft
These requirements formed the skeletal basis from which
a generic design, the AH-80 VIPER (Figures 3.1 through 3.3)
was conceived. As can be seen from the above reguirements,
essential systems and subsystems such as the propulsion
system, the armament system, the flight control system and
31
Figure 3.1 VIPER Insignia
32
Figure 3.2 VIPER side View
33
Figure 3.3 VIPER Front View
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the tail rotor configuration were not specified and there-
fore were left entirely at the discretion of the author.
B. FINAL DESIGN/PERFORMANCE SUMMARY
Overall Aircraft
weight w/fuel 8442.3 lbs
weight empty 57 8 0.0 lbs
length 3 7.5 ft
flat plate area (forward) 13.1 sqft
flat plate area (vertical) 41.8 sqft
Main Rotor System
# main rotor blades 4
rotor radius 23.28 ft
tip velocity 725.98 fps
rotational velocity 31.19 radps
thrust coefficient 0.00396
blade solidity 0.08205
blade aspect ratio 15.518
average lift coefficient 0.26057
blade airfoil lift curve slope 6.25
blade drag coefficient 0.005
disk loading 4.7933
Main Rotor System Performance
maximum advance ratio 0.2 3417
maximum blade loading 0.07
maximum forward velocity 17 knots
tiploss 0.97775
induced power in hover OGE 481.57 SHP
profile power in hover OGE 144.35 SHP
total power in hover OGE 625.90 SHP
figure of merit 0.75257
percent induced power 7 6.94
induced power in hover IGE 416.47 SHP
total power in hover IGE 560.80 SHP
main rotor power (function of A/S) see tabl 3.1
Tail Rotor System
# tail rotor blades 13
radius 2 ft











ALTITUDE- FT TEMPERATURE «* 59 DEC F
AIRSPEED TIP INDUCED PROFILE PARASITE TOTAL
(knots) MACH (SHP) (SHP) (SHP) (SHP)
0.0 0.650 73.05 195.91 259.91 528.88
20.0 0.680 155.36 155.62 26.60 337.58
40.0 0.710 158.03 155.23 25.25 338.51
60.0 0.741 160.78 154.86 23.94 339.58
80.0 0.771 163.63 154.48 22.68 340.79
100.0 0.801 166.58 154.12 21.47 342.16
120.0 0.831 169.63 153.76 20.30 343.68
140.0 0.862 172.78 153.41 19.17 345.36
160.0 0.892 176.06 153.06 18.08 347.20
170.0 0.907 179.45 152.72 17.04 349.21
MAIN ROTOR POWER
SPECIFICATION ALTITUDE
ALTITUDE 4000 FT TEMPERATURE - 95 DEC F
AIRSPEED TIP INDUCED PROFILE PARASITE TOTAL
(knots) MACH (SHP) (SHP) (SHP) (SHP)
0.0 0.629 537.22 116.57 0.00 653.79
20.0 0.658 430.74 117.65 0.88 549.27
40.0 0.688 271.80 120.90 7.05 399.75
60.0 0.717 186.09 126.32 23.78 336.19
80.0 0.746 140.26 133.90 56.37 330.53
100.0 0.775 112.36 143.66 110.09 366.11
120.0 0.805 93.68 155.58 190.24 439.50
140.0 0.834 80.31 169.67 302.10 552.08
160.0 0.863 70.28 185.92 450.95 707.15
170.0 0.878 66.15 194.86 540.90 801.91
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Tail Rotor System Performance
tiploss
induced power in hover OGE
profile power in hover OGE
total power in hover OGE
induced power in hover IGE
total power in hover IGE
tail length



























zero horsepower intercept @SSL
zero horsepower intercept @spec alt
phantom horsepower @SSL
phantom horsepower @spec alt
maximum range velocity
maximum range referred horsepower
maximum range fuel flow
maximum endurance velocity
maximum endurance referred horsepower
maximum endurance fuel flow
cruise fuel flow @ SSL















































ALTITUDE - FT TEMPERATURE =59 DEG. F
AIRSPEED TIP INDUCED PROFILE TOTAL
(knots) MACH (SHP) (SHP) (SHP)
0.0 0.462 39.43 10.87 50.30
20.0 0.492 5.44 11.72 17.16
40.0 0.522 5.56 11.70 17.26
60.0 0.553 5.69 11.67 17.36
80.0 0.583 5.83 11.64 17.47
100.0 0.613 5.98 11.61 17.60
120.0 0.643 6.15 11.58 17.73
140.0 0.674 6.32 11.56 17.88
160.0 0.704 6.51 11.53 18.04




4 000 FT TEMPERATURE 95 DEG.
AIRSPEED TIP INDUCED PROFILE TOTAL
(knots) MACH (SHP) (SHP) (SHP)
0.0 0.447 44.12 8.78 52.91
20.0 0.476 30.94 8.94 39.89
40.0 0.506 12.52 9.43 21.95
60.0 0.535 6.20 10.24 16.44
80.0 0.564 4.53 11.37 15.89
100.0 0.593 4.45 12.82 17.27
120.0 0.623 5.35 14.60 19.95
140.0 0.652 7.26 16.70 23.95
160.0 0.681 10.44 19.12 29.56
170.0 0.696 12.64 20.46 33.10
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TABLE 3.3
TAIL ROTOR POWER WITH VERTICAL STABILIZER
STANDARD SEA LEVEL
_ mm _ —TIT
ALTITUDE = FT TEMPERATURE =59 DEG. F
— — — ln.xvv.ii3 x
TAIL VERT/ MAIN VERT/
AIRSPEED ROTOR STAB ROTOR STAB INDUCED PROFILE TOTAL with v/s
(knots) (lbf) (lbf) (SHP) (*SHP*) (SHP) (SHP) (SHP)
0.0 441.5 0.0 528.9 0.0 39.4 10.9 50.3
20.0 363.0 10.6 337.6 13.2 22.9 11.7 34.0
40.0 267.9 42.3 338.5 52.8 6.9 11.7 18.6
60.0 237.1 95.3 339.6 118.9 2.1 11.7 14.8
80.0 246.0 169.4 340.8 211.3 0.6 11.6 14.7
100.0 285.5 264.6 342.2 330.2 0.1 11.6 16.0
120.0 355.3 381.1 343.7 475.4 0.0 11.6 18.1
140.0 457.7 518.7 345.4 647.1 0.0 11.6 20.7
160.0 596.2 677.5 347.2 845.2 0.0 11.5 23.7
170.0 680.2 764.8 349.2 954.2 0.0 11.5 25.3





4000 FT TEMPERATURE - 95 DEG. F
MAIN VERT/
IRSPEED ROTOR STAB ROTOR STAB INDUCED PROFILE TOTAL with v/s
(knots) (lbf) (lbf) (SHP) (*SHP*) (SHP) (SHP) (SHP)
0.0 461.2 0.0 653.8 0.0 44.1 8.8 52.9
20.0 387.4 8.9 549.3 11.0 29.5 8.9 38.4
40.0 282.0 35.4 399.8 44.2 9.9 9.4. 19.3
60.0 237.1 79.7 336.2 99.4 3.1 10.2 13.3
80.0 233.1 141.7 330.5 176.8 1.0 11.4 12.3
100.0 258.2 221.4 366.1 276.2 0.3 12.8 13.1
120.0 310.0 318.8 439.5 397.8 0.0 14.6 14.6
140.0 389.4 434.0 552.1 541.4 0.0 16.7 16.7
160.0 498.8 566.8 707.2 707.2 0.0 19.1 19.1
170.0 565.6 639.9 801.9 798.3 0.0 20.5 20.5
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Overall Performance
total power req (with high spd eff) see tabl 3.4
compressibility and stall effects see tabl 3.5
C. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
As stated in Chapter II, the first step in any
vulnerability program is a compilation of as much
functional and technical information on the aircraft as
possible. The preceeding aircraft description is the very
minimum required in order to perform and adequate
vulnerability program. In point of fact, this description
should also include as many drawings, both exterior and
interior cross sections as possible. Additionally, all
components and systems should be described as to how they
function, what they are made of, and how they relate to the
overall operation of the aircraft. A brief description of
the six major aircraft systems (the flight control, fuel,
propulsion, rotor and drive, armament and structural
systems) follows. The flight control system will be
described is some detail with the aid of figures and
diagrams, whereas the other systems will be treated with
only a brief discussion.
1. The Flight Control System
The flight control system for the AH-80 is a
standard type helicopter flight control configuration
consisting of a collective assembly for collective pitch
control, a cyclic assembly for cyclic (i.e., lateral and
40
TABLE 3.4
COMPRESSIBILITY AND STALL EFFECTS ON POWER REQUIRED
STANDARD SEA LEVEL
ALTITUDE = FT TEMPERATURE - 59 DEC F
RSPEED ALPHA ALPHA M90 Merit Ps Pm
(kts) (90) (270) (shp) (shp)
0.0 -2.702 3.413 0.8374 0.9085 0.0 0.0
20.0 -1.843 0.678 0.7376 0.8740 0.0 0.0
40.0 -1.822 0.660 0.7361 0.8731 0.0 0.0
60.0 -1.801 0.643 0.7346 0.8723 0.0 0.0
80.0 -1.780 0.626 0.7331 0.8714 0.0 0.0
100.0 -1.758 0.611 0.7316 0.8706 0.0 0.0
120.0 -1.736 0.595 0.7301 0.8697 0.0 0.0
140.0 -1.713 0.581 0.7286 0.8688 0.0 0.0
160.0 -1.690 0.567 0.7271 0.8678 0.0 0.0
170.0 -1.666 0.553 0.7256 0.8669 0.0 0.0
190.0 -1.642 0.540 0.7240 0.8659 0.0 0.0
COMPRESSIBILITY AND STALL EFFECTS ON POWER REQUIRED
SPECIFICATION ALTITUDE
ALTITUDE - 4000 FT TEMPERATURE - 95 DEC F
RSPEED ALPHA ALPHA M90 Merit Ps Pm
(kts) (90) (270) (shp) (shp)
0.0 -2.103 -2.103 0.6291 0.8844 0.0 0.0
20.0 -2.391 -2.068 0.6584 0.8960 0.0 0.0
40.0 -2.668 -2.036 0.6876 0.9071 0.0 0.0
60.0 -1.399 1.829 0.7169 0.8562 0.0 0.0
80.0 -1.842 2.376 0.7461 0.8739 0.0 0.0
100.0 -2.189 3.171 0.7754 0.8879 0.0 0.0
120.0 -2.473 4.279 0.8046 0.8993 0.0 0.0
140.0 -2.710 5.808 0.8339 0.9088
'
0.0 0.0
160.0 -2.920 7.895 0.8631' 0.9172 0.0 0.0
170.0 -3.019 9.201 0.8777 0.9212 0.0 0.0




(With High Speed Effects)
STANDARD SEA LEVEL
ALTITUDE - FT TEMPERATURE =» 59 DEC F
AIRSPEED Pi Po Pp Ps Pm Ptr PT
(kts) (shp) (shp) (shp) (shp) (shp) (shp) (shp)
0.0 73.0 195.9 259.9 0.0 0.0 50.3 674.8
20.0 155.4 155.6 26.6 0.0 0.0 17.2 550.0
40.0 158.0 155.2 25.2 0.0 0.0 17.3 400.8
60.0 160.8 154.9 23.9 0.0 0.0 17.4 353.8
80.0 163.6 154.5 22.7 0.0 0.0 17.5 366.8
100.0 166.6 154.1 21.5 0.0 0.0 17.6 425.0
120.0 169.6 153.8 20.3 0.0 0.0 17.7 527.4
140.0 172.8 153.4 19.2 0.0 0.0 17.9 677.6
160.0 176.1 153.1 18.1 0.0 0.0 18.0 880.9
170.0 179.4 152.7 17.0 0.0 0.0 18.2 1004.4
190.0 183.0 152.4 16.0 0.0 0.0 18.4 1299.3
TOTAL POWER REQUIRED
(With High Speed Effects)
SPECIFICATION ALTITUDE
ALTITUDE - 4000 FT TEMPERATURE - 95 DEC F
AIRSPEED Pi Po Pp Ps Pm Ptr PT
(kts) (shp) (shp) (shp) (shp) (shp) (shp) (shp)
0.0 537.2 116.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 52.9 705.0
20.0 430.7 117.7 0.9 0.0 0.0 39.9 589.2
40.0 271.8 120.9 7.0 0.0 0.0 21.9 421.7
60.0 186.1 126.3 23.8 0.0 0.0 16.4 352.6
80.0 140.3 133.9 56.4 0.0 0.0 15.9 346.4
100.0 112.4 143.7 110.1 0.0 0.0 17.3 383.4
120.0 93.7 155.6 190.2 0.0 0.0 20.0 459.5
140.0 80.3 169.7 302.1 0.0 0.0 24.0 576.0
160.0 70.3 185.9 450.9 0.0 0.0 29.6 736.7
170.0 66.2 194.9 540.9 0.0 0.0 33.1 835.0
190.0 59.2 214.4 755.1 0.0 0.0 42.0 1070.7
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longitudinal) control, and a pedal assembly for directional
control of the aircraft. Additionally, a control surface
has been incorporated on the vertical stabilizer to assist
in aircraft directional control during periods of degraded
tail rotor operation. The collective, cyclic and
directional control systems are depicted in Figures 3.4,
3 . 5 and 3 .
6
During periods of normal operation the aircraft is
controlled in all axes by these flight controls. Pilot
inputs to the collective, cyclic, and pedals result in
electrical signals being sent via electrical wires
eventually to hydraulic servoactuators located below the
mixer assembly for the collective, lateral and longitudinal
channels and in the tail boom for the directional channel.
Should a signal be interupted for any reason there is
automatic and complete mechanical backup available. The
flight control surfaces are both electrically and
mechanically actuated and hydraulically powered in all axes
by a dual hydraulic system. In addition, the mechanical
system is capable of controlling the aircraft in all flight
regimes with a complete loss of hydraulic power. The afore
mentioned "rudder" assembly is a mechanically operated
flight control surface designed to maximize high speed
performance yet still provide the capability for a
nonvertical landing of the aircraft with degraded or no
tail rotor thrust performance. This surface can be manually
43
Figure 3.4 Collective Control System
44
Figure 3.5 Cyclic Control System
45
Figure 3.6 Directional Control System
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set and adjusted to enable the aircraft to be landed at any
airspeed in excess of 70 knots.
The automatic stabilization system incorporates
automatic stabilization equipment (ASE) , which assists the
crew in obtaining and holding a stable weapons platform
under any battlefield conditions in any weather. The flight
computer for the ASE system is located in the forward
avionics mission equipment bay just forward of the crew
station.
2 . The Propulsion System
The propulsion system for the AH-80 features the
installation of twin turboshaft engines. Each engine is
capable of 735 shaft horsepower (SHP) for a total of 1470
SHP available. With this engine installed, the aircraft is
able to sustain forward flight even under single engine
conditions. However, should a single engine condition
result while in a hover at maximum gross weight an
attrition kill would result.
Each engine is installed relative to the fuselage
as shown in Figure 3.7. This installation provides for
maximum protection from expected projectile penetration due
to the location of the stub wings/weapons bays. This
screening effect, when combined with the size and shape of
the inlets, also serves to reduce the radar signature of
the aircraft when viewed from below. The engines are widely





Figure 3.7 Propulsion System Installation
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redundant critical components. The inlets are of S-type
curved design incorporating air particle seperators. The
exhaust is sufficiently cooled by the use of IR suppressors
that engine exhaust does not present a signature problem.
3 . The Rotor and Drive System
The rotor subsystem consists of four main rotor
blades, thirteen tail rotor blades, the main and tail rotor
hubs and the main rotor support structure. Both main and
tail rotor blades are of advanced composite construction
and 1990' s design. The blades themselves are designed to be
invulnerable to a 23 HEI round. The main rotor hub
incorporates standard lead lag hinges, dampers and tension
torsion straps for flapping and feathering motions.
The tail rotor is of FENESTRON design to improve
its strength characteristics, reduce the power required to
obtain the desired performance and also improve the
signature of the overall aircraft. The assembly is mounted
on plastic bearing which requires no lubrication. Blade
pitch change is accomplished by means of a hydraulic servo
unit.
The main rotor support structure consists of a mast
support structure and a static mast. This arrangement
increases the toughness of the mast head and overall rotor
system. Additionally, the main rotor mast supports a mast
mounted IR sight and electronic warfare components.
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The drive subsystem consists of gearboxes on each
engine nose, the gearbox to transmission shaft, the main
transmission, the main and nose gearbox dual lubrication
system, the auxiliary power unit (APU) , the rotor brake
assembly, the tail rotor drive shaft and associated
couplings and the tail rotor gearbox. Each nose gearbox
enables the applicable engine to be decoupled from the main
transmission in the event of a loss of power. The main
transmission itself is capable of performing up to its
design loads for up to 30 minutes after a complete loss of
lubrication. The tail rotor drive shaft is ballistically
tolerant and considered invulnerable to a 23mm HEI round.
4 . The Armament System
The VIPER is an extremely potent light attack
helicopter. All weaponry is located internal to the
aircraft in an effort to reduce the radar signature and and
improve its high speed performance by reducing the profile
drag. This effort has been very successful with the
incorporation of a stub wing/weapons bay. Each wing houses
four antiarmor missiles and one air-to-air missile. Further
signature reduction is achieved by the use of electrically
operated doors which cover the weapons ports when not in
use. These doors are fail safe open, enabling all weapons
to be operational in the event of an electrical failure.
Located forward and below the pilot and to the left of the
centerline of the aircraft is an internally mounted 20mm
50
gatling gun and linkless feed system. The gun is powered by
the aircraft hydraulic and electrical system.
5. The Fuel System
The AH-80 fuel system consists of two tanks
situated fore and aft along the aircraft centerline, and
all associated plumbing, filters and pressurization
equipment. One electrical fuel transfer pump is located
within each fuel cell. There is no provision for either
conventional helicopter in flight refueling (HIFR) or in
flight refueling via a probe due to the single crew concept
and the problems and weight associated with installation of
a fuel probe. As much of the plumbing as practical is
internal to the tank to reduce the overall vulnerable area
of the fuel system. The two tanks together have a capacity
of 912.27 pounds of JP-5 which provides the VIPER with a
range in excess of 250 nautical miles. This allows the
VIPER ample reserve to accomplish its mission.
Fire/explosion suppression foam is installed in the ullage
of both tanks, and both tanks are self sealing.
6. The Structural System
The major structural sections of the AH-8 are the
forward fuselage section, the center fuselage/stub wing
section, the upper fairing, the tail boom and the
empennage. The forward fuselage section houses the 2 0mm
gun, the forward avionics bay, the forward fuel tank, the
cockpit and the forward main landing gear.
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The center fuselage section serves as the major
structural load bearing member containing the main
transmission support assembly, the main transmission, the
aft fuel tank, the aft main landing gear, the stub wings
and the engine mounts and propulsion system.
The upper fairing serves as a mount for the main
rotor support assembly including the static mast and the
mast mounted infared sight.
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IV. AH-8 MISSION/THREAT ANALYSIS
A. MISSION ANALYSIS
The AH-80 VIPER is designed and armed as a multi-
mission all weather light attack helicopter. Additional
duties could include scout/reconnaissance, antipersonnel,
flank security and utility. The ordnance load for all
missions is 8 antiarmor missiles, 2 air to air missiles and
a 20mm gatling gun. The antiarmor missle is a semiactive
homing weapon while the air to air missle is an IR homing
missile. This ordnance can be delivered from any flight
regime on target and in any weather. Three particular
mission profiles are examined. The first of these is a
generic antiarmor mission as depicted in Figure 4.1. The
second, depicted in Figure 4.2, is a reconnaissance
mission, and the third is the flank security mission
profile depicted in Figure 4.3. Airspeeds and flight
tactics are also listed for each profile.
For this case study, the generic antiarmor mission has
been chosen. This is an offensive mission with a combat
radius of action of up to 300km. This is well within the
capabilities of the VIPER. The targets to be engaged can
be estimated as approximately 50% tanks, 40% armored
vehicles and 10% personnel and other aircraft. The tactics
employed during these engagements are similar to those
currently employed by aircraft already in the inventory.
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Several scenarios are possible. The first involves the
VIPER fighting as a section of two aircraft. Each VIPER is
equipped with a mast mounted laser designator which enables
it to mask itself and still designate the target for a
second Viper which engages the target with its antiarmor
weaponry. This section could also consist of one VIPER and
some other helicopter currently in the inventory. In the
second scenario, the AH-80's speed, power, maneuverability
and superior targeting capabilities enable it to act
completely autonomously, engaging enemy targets without
masking and while performing evasive maneuvers to decrease
its overall susceptibility. The 20mm gun and the air to
air missiles can be used in an air to air role, whereas the
20mm can also be used against ground targets. Specific
tactics as conceived by the author are depicted in Figures
4.4, 4.5 and 4.6.
B. THREAT ANALYSIS
The VIPER is strickly an army helicopter operating from
a land base. Therfore, the expected threats include only
those systems employed by enemy block land forces. No
naval weaponry is expected to be encountered. These
threats include air defense artillery such as 23mm and 57mm
guns, lazer weaponry, air defense missile systems, standard
artillery, tank main guns, small caliber gun fire, ground
54
launched anti-armor weaponry and hostile high performance
aircraft/helicopters
.
The threat chosen for this study is a generic surface
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Figure 4. 2 Generic Reconnaissance Mission Profile
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Figure 4.4 Specific Antiarmor Mission Profile
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VIPER 2 NOE INGRESS













Figure 4.6 Conceptual Tactics
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V. AH-80 FLIGHT AND MISSION ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS
Flight essential functions are those system and
subsystem functions required to enable an aircraft to
sustain controlled flight. Mission essential functions are
those system and subsystem functions required to enable an
aircraft to perform its designated mission. Flight
essential functions are very clearly those functions which
are performed by critical components, defined as any
component whose loss or damage would lead to a loss of
lift, thrust or control. In the AH-80, the most obvious of
these critical components is the main rotor system which
provides for all three of these flight essential functions.
Mission essential functions are those which are performed
during various phases of flight but not during others.
Functions such as navigation, communication, weapons
delivery and target tracking are not functions which are
necessary to keep the aircraft under controlled flight.
Rather they are only required while performing a designated
mission. The missions required are outlined in the
Mission/Threat analysis.
Table 5.1 is a list of the systems and subsystems
incorporated in the AH-80 VIPER and their functions. Using
this list, each individual system/subsystem can be examined
for each particular phase of flight. The phases of flight






Cruise to Laager Area
4. Cruise to Holding Position




Table 5.2 correlates these mission phases with the flight
and mission essential functions required for each.
By combining Table 5.1 and 5.2, a matrix can be
developed which shows which systems or subsystems are
required for each phase of flight. It would be entirely too
complex and counterproductive to investigate each phase in
this type of case study. Therefore, as it is the most
interesting, the phase during which the target is engaged
will be examined in detail. It can subdivided into the
following subphases:
1. Locate and identify target
2. Verify target range
3. Hover/Cruise into firing position
4. Launch antiarmor missiles
5. Launch air to air missiles
6. Fire 20mm gatling gun
7. Depart firing position
8. Land at FARRP and reload
Concentrating on these subphases results in a matrix
which shows which systems are required during each subphase
of the targeting phase of flight. (Table 5.3) From such a
table it can be seen exactly which functions are considered
flight essential and which ones are considered mission
essential. Each system contributes to the success or
failure of the subphase in some way. Some are obviously
63
required for flight, such as the rotor system while others
are strickly mission such as the antiarmor missile system.
Chapter VI will use all of the information developed up
to this point to produce the AH-8 0's FMEA and DMEA or as
presented together here, the FMECA.
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TABLE 5.1 SYSTEMS/SUBSYSTEMS AND FUNCTIONS
System/Subsystem Function

















































Provide for control of
aerodynamic surfaces
such as main rotor and
tail rotor pitch
Provide for structural
integrity of the aircraft
Provide for translation
of engine shaft horse-
power into main and tail
rotor rotational velocity
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VI. AH-80 FAILURE MODE, EFFECTS, AND CRITICALITY ANALYSIS
In the previous chapter, the essential functions
required for the VIPER to continue its mission, and the
major systems and subsystems required to perform those
essential functions, were identified. The next step in a
critical component analysis is to conduct a Failure Mode,
Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) . The FMECA is
broken down into two distinct phases for ease of analysis,
the Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) , and the
Damage Mode and Effects Analysis (DMEA) . This chapter will
apply the FMECA methodology described in a general sense in
Chapter II, and presented in Reference l:ppl40-153,
specifically to the AH-80. Additionally, though not
required by MIL-STD-2069 [Ref.4], a Fault Tree Analysis
(FTA) is also included as an aid in the identification of
the critical components.
A. AH-80 FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA)
"The failure mode and effects analysis is a procedure
that: (1) identifies and documents all possible failure
modes of a component or subsystem and (2) determines the
effects of each failure mode upon the capability of the
system or subsystem to perform its essential functions."
As can be seen from this definition, the FMEA is in no way
concerned with the cause of the failure, only the effect
71
that that component failure had on the individual subsystem
or system it was a member of. "The FMEA is normally
provided by engineers who are concerned with system safety,
reliability and maintainability. It is based on design
requirements, historical data (if the system is still in
the concept stage)
,
predicted performance measurements and
sound engineering judgement.
"
[Ref. 3 :p70] As described
earlier, the AH-80 flight control system will be the only
system analyzed in detail using the FMEA methodology. Each
component is examined to determine the role that it plays
in the flight control system, what effect its damage would
have on its immediate subsystem, and the effect of the
failure on the overall mission capability of the VIPER. The
results of this analysis are presented in the FMEA matrix,
Table 6.1.
B. DAMAGE-CAUSED FAILURE ANALYSIS
As in reference 3, the material presented in this
phase of the case study will consist of five sections:
(1) The DMEA Matrix, (2) The Disablement Diagram, (3) The
Fault Tree Analysis, (4) The Kill Tree, and (5) The P(k/h)
Functions. The DMEA Matrix, Disablement Diagram, and the
FTA will be presented for the flight control system alone,
whereas the Kill Tree, and P(k/h) functions will be
presented for the entire aircraft. MIL-STD-2069 [Ref. 4]
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components is complete; however, here the list will be
presented following the FTA in order to show that this list
is the natural result of the progression of the analysis
from the FMEA, through the DMEA Matrix, the Disablement
Diagram, and the FTA. The P(k/h) functions and the list of
critical components are required in the next chapter for
the vulnerability assessment. Therefore, they must contain
components from the entire aircraft, just as if the
analysis had been carried out on the entire aircraft all
along.
1. The DMEA Matrix
Unlike the FMEA, the DMEA is concerned with the
cause of the component failure. Specifically, damage
caused by a man made hostile environment, i.e. combat, such
as fire, explosion, or fragment penetration is identified
and examined. "In the DMEA, the potential component or
subsystem failures identified in the FMEA, as well as other
possible damage-caused failures, are evaluated to determine
their relationship to the selected kill level.
"
[Ref. I:pl42]
The DMEA Matrix is presented in Table 6.2. The
components and their damage-caused failure modes are
related to applicable kill criteria and component
redundancy relationships. Reference is also made to Table





















































o cn • 44 o
.-1 c U E OH MH C
o
W
S•H O I3ho o o
10 -H
> 4J i a> 4J m° ^ Tc
10 «3 u . x: c W 4= J* ui • O
o 5,
Ul -H
•H >,4J O o u O • -H >,-H3 rH U
ST o -5 j=
rH 4J
•H
c a 4J 0> O 1-1
4-> C u O •3 rH W Ul 44
O to 44 8 106 9o e
E (0 4J
4J (B 4J -H
u
4J -rH
u CO 4J M Ch
•H 10 3 3 73 . •H U 44o> C r-l -H 10 C
io o to I>,-r4.
4= U, W W
u c
in to a) >
(0 Ul -H
o> a o0) -H
4?
Ul -iH U 44 (0 44
o 13 c y
>- 44H O -H i § u -s -3U-H O «• iH 44 Ul
T? -£ f) -H -H rH3 Ul 4J i-H
•H O 4J IU| rCH 0)k U 44 O 44 3 ui w
10 44 -H O 10 4= 10 44
-SB'S in c
Sss
44 CT> Ul O i-l
Ui -H "O 1) i—
1
35 >,H O iuiStIUO 10 r-l >iH -rHOiUX 11 >
12
X X X X X
XX X X X X










n*n 'ri mWU4 «s 3U Ul O Ul 4J
0> Oi Oi O
!? ? w ? b
li I) B Si 3








Ul Ul O Ul Ul 44 44



















10 44 01 O
Ul -rH 3 W
o> cn O" in
44 C Ul -r4
10 O O (J





d ui Q. >
0) '"I C 0» **4
> rH 44 IQ rH rH 44
•h in y ui Q. O O
44 41 U 2 Ul J)
'H t-^ t-i O 44 rH
01 C rH rH O C rH
rH a O 01 0> O OHit O 40 "O O O
to
rH I jc cn
o o> o c
Ul CnH -r4
44 10 44 Ul
H
ci iii a





XZ O 44 Ul






o -5 o to
1
UJH\ 334.
44 44 ^ U 0.4= 44 10CrHiocoi inoa
o 8 o ui 71 13 cL t>
•H -rl O 3 Ul 4= 10OCrHrHOO/CnUH^ UH UU CilHHi >,« { « O-HH


































































































1 1rH JZ M
1| soil
jj e cp^
o 5) ro TJ
ii JJ j< 0>












S H-l U w
u
0) C "3 -H





•H o xi * -3
Ou-H 4J >
U -tH C U kl




O 4J UBh II II
"O (0 4J 4) >
<B O Q -H &







•U --H O 3
3
r-j O -U U
C U C « ) li
- 3 O
3OU+JO-'H>>'0C
UHH I UU4J uo^HUKijuyyu-HPRM ,* ,"t ID






The flight control system Disablement Diagram is
presented in Figure 6.1. The diagram is a depiction of the
locations of individual components within the overall
system and shows the failure mode of the individual
component, the effect of the failure, and the resultant
aircraft kill criterion. For the purposes of this case
study, only a few failures are shown on this diagram.
3 The Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
The FTA is presented here for the loss of control
situation only. Reference 3 contains an example of the
power of an FTA when performed on an entire aircraft. The
methodology for this analysis is discussed in Reference 1,
pages 149-151. The FTA begins with an undesired event, and
then determines what event or series of events will lead to
the undesired result. Logic symbology is used in the fault
tree or as it is sometimes called, the Failure Analysis
Logic Tree (FALT) . The FTA is one of the principal methods
of system safety analysis, and can include both hardware
failures and human effects.
The undesired event for the VIPER is an A-level
attrition kill. While the attrition kill category can be
broken down into either the aircraft can not fly, or the
aircraft can not land, only the former situation will be
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Figure 6.1 AH-80 Flight Control System Disablement Diagram
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Figure 6.2 and Table 6.3 show the results of this
analysis. Together they break down the aircraft, just as
the FMEA did, to determine what event, or series of events,
will cause an attrition kill.
4. The Kill Tree
The Kill Tree for the AH-8 is presented in Figure
6.3 for the forward flight mode. This "tree" is a pictorial
representation of the critical components and their
redundancy relationships. It is invaluable when trying to
determine, at a glance, the redundancy relationships for
individual systems and subsystems. Components presented in
series are nonredundant as their kill alone will sever the
trunk of the tree and therefore kill the aircraft.
Components presented in parallel are redundant components,
as two or more components must be killed in order to sever
the trunk.
5. The Pfk/h) Functions
The final step in the DMEA process is a listing of
the P(k/h) functions for the critical components. The
P(k/h) function defines the probability of killing a
component, given that it is hit by a fragment or
penetrator. This listing is the first step in quanti-
tatively assessing the aircraft's vulnerability. Normally,
this list would contain every critical component for each
aircraft system and subsystem. However, in order to
simplify the list and clarify the methodology involved
85
Figure 6. 2 AH- 80 FALT
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Figure 6.2 ( cont. ) AH- 80 FALT
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Figure 6.2 ( cont. ) AH- 80 FALT
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Figure 6.2 ( cont. ) AH- 80 FALT
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Figure 6.2 ( cont. ) AH- 80 FALT
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TABLE 6.3 ( cont
.
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Figure 6.2 ( cont. ) AH- 80 FALT
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Figure 6.2 ( cont. ) AH- 80 FALT
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TABLE 6.3 (cont.)







control rods (lat/long) jam/sever
rod ends jam/sever
rodend bearings jam/sever








feel trim act (lat/long) penetration




















Figure 6.2 ( cont. ) AH- 80 FALT
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TABLE 6.3 (cont.)
B2 21 ROD/LINKAGE JAMMED
COMPONENT LIST
COMPONENT DAMAGE












































Figure 6.2 ( cont. ) AH- 80 FALT
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TABLE 6.3 (cont.)












































Figure 6.2 ( cont. ) AH- 80 FALT
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TABLE 6.3 (cont.)












Figure 6.2 ( cont. ) AH- 80 FALT
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TABLE 6.3 (cont.)
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Figure 6.2 ( cont. ) AH- 80 FALT
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TABLE 6.3 (cont.)







B3 4 2 JAMMED CONTROL SURFACE
COMPONENT LIST
COMPONENT DAMAGE
rudder mounting hinges jam/sever
control linkages jam/sever



































Figure 6. 3 AH- 80 Kill Tree
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Figure 6. 3 ( cont. ) AH- 80 Kill Tree
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Figure 6.3 ( cont. ) AH- 80 Kill Tree
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for the reader, the list has been abbreviated to only a few
selected components from each major aircraft system.
Redundant and nonredundant critical components are
represented in order to provide a thorough understanding of
component redundancy, and its effect on the vulnerability
assessment.
As can be seen in Figure 6.4 [Ref . I:pl56] , P(k/h)
data for fragments is normally presented graphically as a
function of the grain size of the fragment and the impact
velocity. This data is obtained for the uninstalled
component from a variety of methods varying from careful
analysis of the individual component and its construction
to actual live fire testing. "Numbers for P(k/h) are
eventually assigned based upon a combination of empirical
information, engineering judgement, and experience."
Critical components, for the purposes of this case
study, will be assigned a specific P(k/h) value instead of
a function. These values are shown in Table 6.4 and are
for the uninstalled component being struck by a 100 grain
fragment at a striking velocity of 4000 feet per second.
These values are for completely generic components and are
not based on any actual data or current aircraft. They are
presented for the purpose of conducting a vulnerability
assessment on the AH-80 in the following chapter. The
location of the component within the aircraft will have an
116
effect on its ultimate value for the probability of kill












Figure 6.4 Example P(k/h) Function
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TABLE 6.4 CRITICAL COMPONENT LIST
BY MAJOR SYSTEMS GROUPING
MAJOR SYSTEMS P(k/h) VALUES FOR 100






Left Inlet Duct 0.2
Right Inlet Duct . 2
Left Accessory Gearbox 0.75
Right Accessory Gearbox 0.75
Left Engine Driveshaft 0.3
Right Engine Driveshaft 0.3
Engine Mounts
Left Mount Forward 0.2
Right Mount Forward . 2
Left Mount Aft 0.
1








Fuel in Forward Feed Tank 0.2
Fuel in Aft Transfer Tank 0.3
Fuel Feed Lines 0.2
Engine Fuel Accessories 1.0
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TABLE 6.4 (cont.) CRITICAL COMPONENT LIST
BY MAJOR SYSTEMS GROUPING
MAJOR SYSTEMS P(k/h) VALUES FOR 10




Generator No. 1 0.2
Generator No. 2 0.2
Battery .
3
Wiring Channel A 0.5
Wiring Channel B 0.5
Longitudinal Hydraulic Assist 0.8
Lateral Hydraulic Assist 0.8




Collective Wiring Bundle 0.4





Cyclic Control Rods 0.4
Rodends 0.3 5
Lateral/Longitudinal Hydraulic Actuators 0.3
Cyclic Linkages 0.3
Collective Control Rods 0.4
Collective Hydraulic Actuator 0.3
Directional Control Rods 0.4





2 0mm Ammunition Drum 0.7
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TABLE 6.4 (cont.) CRITICAL COMPONENT LIST
BY MAJOR SYSTEMS GROUPING
MAJOR SYSTEMS P(k/h) VALUES FOR 100









Tail Boom Longeron (upper left) 0.2
Tail Boom Longeron (upper right) 0.2
Tail Boom Longeron (lower left) 0.2
Tail Boom Longeron (lower right) 0.2
Vertical Stabilizer Leading Spar 0.3
Vertical Stabilizer Trailing Spar 0.3
Transmission System
Main Transmission 0.1
Engine Nose Gearboxes 0.25
Tail Rotor Gearbox 0.2
Rotor Systems
Main Rotor Blades 0.0
Tail Rotor Blades 0.0
Main Rotor Mast 0.0
Main Rotor Hub and Grip 0.0
Main Rotor Pitch Horns 0.1
Pitch Link Rodends 0.35
Tail Rotor Driveshaft 0.1
Tail Rotor Drive Couplings 0.4
Tail Rotor Hub 0.1
Tail Rotor Drive Links 0.2
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VII. AH-8 VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
The final process developed in this case study will be
the AH-80 vulnerability assessment. "A vulnerability
assessment is the process of determining numerical values
for the measures of vulnerability." [Ref.l:pl53] This
assessment may be carried out either by hand or by using
several different computer programs that are available. The
former approach will be used here.
The type of vulnerability assessment performed depends
upon the vulnerability measure used and upon the damage
mechanism considered. Reference 1, pages 153-198, discusses
these factors thoroughly, with the damage mechanisms
ranging from nonexplosive penetrators or fragments, to
internally and externally detonating warheads, to lasers.
Following that material, an overview of the various
computer programs is presented.
An aircraft's vulnerability to nonexplosive penetrators
or fragments can be broken down into single hit
vulnerability, the methodology for which is presented in
Reference 1, pages 160-169, and multiple hit vulnerability,
the methodology for which is presented in Reference 1,
pages 169-180. This assessment of the VIPER will determine
the aircraft's vulnerability to a single 100 grain
fragment with an impact velocity of 4000 feet per second.
The methodology for the assessment will be the same as
122
presented for the A-2 in Reference 3 and used by the
computer programs FASTGEN and COVART. [Ref . I:ppl92-195]
FASTGEN is a shotline generation program. In the
shotline program
shotline descriptions are obtained by superimposing a
planar grid over the target model and by passing
parallel shotlines or rays from the attack direction
(normal to the grid) through the individual grid cells.
One shotline is randomly located within each cell. The
programs trace the path of a shotline through the
aircraft and generate sequential lists of components
and fluid and air spaces encountered along the shot-
line. Specific component data, such as thickness and
shotline obliquity, are also recorded. This procedure
is repeated for all shotlines originating from the
selected attack directions. [Ref . I:ppl93-194]
COVART is a vulnerable area routine. It generates
component and total aircraft vulnerable area tables for a
single penetrator or fragment using the shotline approach
to compute the vulnerable area. For both programs, the
amount of output depends upon the number of aircraft
aspects and on the size of the cell examined. Figure 7.1
shows the 2 6 different aircraft aspects required for a
detailed analysis. [Ref . I:pl82 ] For the VIPER assessment,
only the "45 degree elevation and 225 degree azimuth"
aspect will be used to showcase the methodology and not
inundate the reader with too much information.
As was done in Reference 3 to simulate the
FASTGEN/COVART computer analysis, a grid with five foot by
five foot major sections is superimposed over the AH-80 as
shown in Figure 7.2. These sections are subdivided into 25
123
Figure 7.1 AH-80 Assessment Aspect
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Figure 7.2 AH-80 Shotline Grid
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equal sections measuring one foot by one foot. A shotline
is then randomly located in only three of these one foot by
one foot cells for the sake of simplicity. The three
shotlines investigated are:
1. Nonredundant components with overlap, (shotline 1)
2. Redundant components with no overlap, (shotline 2)
3. Redundant components with overlap. (shotline 3)
These shotlines are depicted in Figure 7.2 and Figure 7.3.
A fourth shotline case is possible, nonredundant components
with no overlap; however it will not be discussed here as
it is assumed by the author to be fairly straight forward
and clear.
A. VULNERABILITY CALCULATIONS
Table 7.1 lists the critical components intercepted by
the three shotlines. The presented area for each of these
components is one square foot, the same as the grid area.
As described in Reference 3, a subtle difference between
the assessment technique presented there, and the
assessment presented in Reference 1, is that in the latter
everything is based upon component presented area, whereas
the former is based upon the cell presented area. This
assessment will also be based upon the cell presented area.
The two methods will yield converging solutions as the cell
size is reduced.
126
Figure 7.3 AH-80 Flight Control System Shotline Intercept
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TABLE 7.1
CRITICAL COMPONENTS INTERSECTED BY SHOTLINES
Shotline #1
1. Tail Rotor Driveshaft
2. Tail Rotor Driveshaft Hangar Bearing
Shotline #2





4 Lower Right Longeron




3 Lateral Channel Mechanical Control Rod
4 Lateral Channel Electrical Wiring
5
.
Forward Lower Right Longeron
6. Right Stub Wing Forward Spar
1. Definitions
The following definitions were copied directly from
Reference 3, pages 171-172 and then modified to apply to
this case study.
ci: This subscript represents the "ith" component
on the "cth" shotline. In this case study,
"c" will have the value of 1, 2 or 3, depend-
ing on the particular cell or shotline being
analyzed. Shotline/cell 1 (li) is the aft
shotline. Shotline/cell 2 (2i) is the





ci The vulnerable area of the "ith" component onthe "cth" shotline. The number that "i" re-
presents is the number assigned to the compo-




The presented area of each cell. As mention-
ed earlier, this value is a constant
at 1.0 square feet.
P<s/h .>: The probability of the "ith" component on the




The probability of the "ith" component on the
"cth" shotline being killed given a hit on
this component. These values are also known
as the installed P<k/h> values.
P<S/H
c
>: The probability of the aircraft surviving
given a hit on the "cth" cell.
P<K/H >: The probability of the aircraft being killed
given a hit on the "cth" cell.
A<V >:
c
The vulnerable area of the "cth" cell.
A<P>: The presented area of the entire aircraft.
P<S/H>: The aircraft probability of survival given a
random hit on the aircraft.
P<K/H>: The aircraft probability of kill given a
random hit on the aircraft.
A<V>: The total single hit vulnerable area of the
aircraft, relative to the presented aspect.
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2 . Mathematical Relationships
The following mathematical relationships were
copied directly from Reference 3 and will be used to
determine the single hit vulnerability of the AH-80. They
are also available in Reference 1, pages 159-169. For "n"




cl >) (P<s/hc2 >) . . . (<Ps/hcn>) (7.1)
P<s/h





( p<k/hci >) (A<pc >) (7.3)








A<V> = A<V.> + A<V > + . . . + A<VXT> (7.6)12 N
P<K/H> = A<V>/A<P> (7.7)
P<S/H> = 1 - P<K/H> (7.8)
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3 . Nonredundant Components with Overlap (Shotline 1)
The first shotline to be considered is the aft
shotline passing through the tailboom and two nonredundant
critical components which overlap each other. The
methodology for this type shotline is presented in
Reference 1, pages 163-166 and in Reference 3, pages 173-
176. The critical components intersected by this shotline
are again listed in Table 7.2, along with their uninstalled
P<k/h> values. Additionally the installed P<k/h> value has
been estimated and listed. As in Reference 3, the component
vulnerable area in each cell (A<v .>) is equal to its
ci ^
installed P<k/h> value because each cell's presented area
is one square foot by definition of A<p >. The same
definition applies to all three shotlines.
TABLE 7.2 SHOTLINE #1
NONREDUNDANT COMPONENTS WITH OVERLAP
Component P<k/h > P<k/h .
>
1. Tail Rotor Driveshaft 0.1 0.075
2. Tail Rotor Driveshaft 0.4 0.3 5
Hangar Bearing
131
The methodology for determining the vulnerability-
measures of the aircraft given a hit by shotline number one
in cell one is now presented.
The value for P<S/H
1
> is determined using equations 7.1
and 7.2, and the values presented in Table 7.2.
P<S/H
1
> = (1 - P<k/h
i;L
>)(l - P<k/h12 >)




> = (1 - 0.075) (1 - 0.35)
= 0.6013
To determine the probability of killing the aircraft by
the given shot, equation 7.4 is used.
P<K/H
1
> = 1 - P<S/H
1
>
= 1 - 0.6013
= 0.3988
The vulnerable area of cell number one can now be
calculated using equation 7.5.
A<V
3
> = (P<K/H >) (A<P >)
= (0.3988) (1.0 ft. 2 )
= 0.3988 ft. 2
The value for P<K/H
T
> found here is relatively low
due to the fact that very few critical components were
intersected. This situation is obviously benificial
regardless of whether overlap exists or not. The next
shotline will show the effect of overlap and also the
effect an increased number of critical components
intersected can have on the overall aircraft vulnerability.
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4 . Redundant Components with No Overlap (Shotline 2)
The second shotline examined is one passing through
redundant components which do not overlap their redundant
partner (s) . This situation will be used to show the effect
of component redundancy on the overall vulnerability, and
to investigate the effects of cascading damage. Cascading
damage is that damage which is secondary to the damage
caused by the shot itself. For example, if a shotline
intersects a redundant fuel tank, that hit alone may not
cause the loss of the aircraft. However, if the fuel tank
is located in such a way as to allow it to leak into the
engine inlet thereby killing the engine, and hence the
aircraft, the vulnerability of the tank must be looked at
carefully.
To illustrate this situation here, the redundant
component intersected will be the lateral channel hydraulic
assist actuator. It is redundant by virtue of the fact that
the aircraft can be flown, using its mechanical flight
control system, without the benefit of hydraulic assist.
However, the actuator is located in close proximity to the
swashplate assembly which is critical to both the
mechanical and electrical control systems. Should the
actuator leak hydraulic fluid which ignites and destroys
the swashplate assembly, the aircraft would be killed.
Following the methodology presented in Reference 3, pages
176-181, the cascading effect "essentially creates another
133
critical component" which must be added to the list of
components intersected by the shotline. This list is
presented in Table 7.3.
Component
TABLE 7.3 SHOTLINE #2

































In the first set of calculations, cascading damage
will not be considered. Comparitive calculations will then
be performed to illustrate the effect of redundancy.
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The nonredundant, noncascading calculation uses all of
the above components (1,2, 3, 4, and 5) yielding
P<S/H > = (1 - 0.75) (1 - 0.075) (1 - 0.15) see (7.1)








> = 0.9165 ft. 2 see (7.5)
The noncascading situation where component redundancy
is a factor uses only the nonredundant components
(2,4,5) in the calculations. Thus,
P<S/H
2








> = 0.6069 ft. 2 see (7.5)
These calculations make it readily apparent that in
this situation, component redundancy has a major effect on
the aircraft's vulnerability in this cell. Simply by having
redundant components, P<K/H > is reduced from 0.9165 to
0.6069, a major improvement.
In the next set of calculations, cascading damage
will be examined. As was stated before, the existence of
the cascading damage essentially creates another critical
component which must be included in the calculations. This
critical component, the swashplate, is killed 25% of the
135
time this cell is hit because of a fire associated with the
leaking hydraulic fluid.
For the nonredundant, cascading situation the following
calculations apply using components 1,13,2,3,4 and 5.
P<S/H > = (1 - 0.75) (1 - 0.25) (1 - 0.075) (1 - 0.15)








> = .9373 ft. 2 see (7.5)
The redundant, cascading situation uses only the













> = 0.7052 ft. 2 see (7.5)
The effect of component redundancy is once again
seen in the above results. Additionally, the effect that
cascading damage can have on an aircraft is shown. For the
redundant situation the probability of a kill given a hit
in cell 2 rose from 0.6069 to 0.7052. This again is a
significant increase in vulnerability.
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5. Redundant Components with Overlap (Shotline 3)
The third and final shotline to be investigated
passes through redundant components which overlap each
other. This overlap raises the possibility that a single
shot will kill both components. For this reason, equation
7.1 must be modified as discussed in Reference 1, pages
168-169. In essence, the probability that both are killed,
assuming this causes an aircraft kill, is equal to the
product of their individual probabilities of kill given
that they are hit. Equation 7.2 must also be modified to
include this product. To alleviate any confusion, the
equations will be presented once again in detail. Table 7.4
lists the components intersected by the shotline in the
same manner as used previously.
TABLE 7.4 SHOTLINE 3
REDUNDANT COMPONENTS WITH OVERLAP
Component
1. Cyclic Stick 0.3
2. Pilot 1.0



























For the redundant with overlap situation, Equation 7.1
is modified as follows
P<S/H
3
> = (1 - (P<k/h33 >) (P<k/h 34 >)) (1 - P<k/h31 )
(1 - P<k/h 32 >)(l - P<k/h35>)(l - P<k/h 36 >)




> = (1 - (0.2) (0.4) ) (1 - 0.2)(1 - 0.9) (1 - 0.1)
(1 - 0.1)








> = 0.9404 ft. 2 see (7.5)
For comparitive purposes, if the shotline did not
intersect the two redundant overlapping components,
equation 7.1 can be used without being modified. The
same situation as that of shotline number 2 would
exist. Using only the nonredundant components
P<S/H
3
> = (1 - 0.2) (1 - 0.9) (1 - 0.1) (1 - 0.1)








> = 0.9352 ft. 2 see (7.5)
As can be seen, the overlapping of redundant
critical components has a definite adverse effect on the
probability of kill given a hit.
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6. Overall Aircraft Survivability
The AH-80's overall vulnerable area and probability
of survival can now be determined using Equations 7.6, 7.7,
and 7.8. These values are in no way intended to be
realistic and are only presented as a means of pulling the
assessment together in a clear, understandable manner.
Equation 7.6 states:
A<V> = A<V n > + A<V-> + + A<VXT>12 N
In an actual assessment each of (N) cells would have
a shotline for the aspect chosen and would therefore
have a calculated A<V >. For the purposes of this case
study only three cells were chosen. Therefore, the
overall vulnerable area is estimated as follows
A<V> = 0.3988 ft. 2 + 0.9261 ft. 2 + 0.9404 ft. 2 + A<V„>
4
+ . . . + A<V. T>N
= 18.2 ft. 2
Equation 7.7 is used to determine the overall





Finally, the probability that the VIPER will survive is
computed using Equation 7.8 as follows:
P<S/H> = 1 - P<K/H>
= 1 - 0.0758
= 0.9242
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B. VULNERABILITY REDUCTION FEATURES
In this final section, Reference 1, pages 198-221, will
be paraphrazed to introduce the reader to the various forms
vulnerability reduction can take, the systems those forms
apply to, and how it specifically applies to the VIPER.
In review, the six vulnerability reduction concepts are:




3. Passive damage suppression
4. Active damage suppression
5. Component shielding
6. Component elimination
To some extent, all of these concepts can be seen in the
design of the AH-80.
1. The Flight Control System
The principle kill modes for the flight control
system are disruption of the control signal path and jammed
control surfaces. To combat these, multiple, independent
and widely seperated control paths must be used. In
addition, jam-proof actuators and control decouplers are
necessary. In the VIPER, the principle flight control
system is a fly-by-wire system which decreases the
vulnerability of the system due to its small size. Two
relatively independent control systems are provided, with
each having complete authority in all modes of flight. True
redundancy is not achieved however, due to the small size
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of the aircraft. This was shown by the single point kill
achieved on shotline number two. True redundancy is also
difficult to achieve in helicopters due to the requirement
for a rotating/nonrotating control interface, i.e., the
swashplate and mixer assembly. This particular assembly is
very vulnerable and can only be protected through the use




The propulsion system for the AH-80 is well
designed for true redundancy. In addition, its location and
inlet geometry minimize the possibility of fuel ingestion
or inlet flow distortion which can plague many fixed wing
designs. As with any engine, combustor case perforation or
turbine/compressor failure will kill the engine, however,
the AH-80 is a single engine capable aircraft and the
engines have been designed to prevent any catastophic
damage caused by cascading effects.
3 The Fuel System
Reference 1, pages 203-213, describes in great
detail the very important subject of minimizing the
vulnerability of the aircraft fuel system. History has
taught us that this system is probably the greatest
contributor to fixed wing aircraft kills. The AH-80 fuel
system, like any other helicopter's is vulnerable due to
its location in the lower portion of the fuselage.
Considering the VIPER'S mission, this system could be a
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prime target for ground fire. To reduce the vulnerability,
passive techniques such as flexible and rigid foam can be
used as well as various inerting systems. Active damage
suppression techniques are used to combat fire problems.
4
.
The Rotor and Drive System
The primary kill modes for the rotor and drive
system are a loss of lubrication and structural/mechanical
failure. The main transmission used in the AH-80 is
designed to maintain its mechanical integrity for more than
3 minutes without lubrication. Both the tail and main
rotor subsystems are designed to withstand the expected
threat. The tail rotor drive shaft and hangar bearings
were examined using shotline number one and found to
provide a reasonable degree of invulnerability.
5. The Crew System
Crew protection through airframe, seat or body
armor is often used for aircraft with missions similar to
that of the AH-80. The VIPER has the power and lift
capability for an increased crew protection system.
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VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS
This vulnerability assessment is by no means the final
step in assessing the survivability of the AH-80 VIPER.
Several follow-on steps are recommended here to provide a
more complete and accurate assessment.
1. Perform a more complete and accurate system design
for all the systems present in the AH-8 0. This will
allow a complete FMEA, DMEA, and Fault Tree Analysis,
resulting in a more complete list of critical
components and a more accurate shotline assessment.
2. Produce a methodology addressing the multiple hit
vulnerability of the VIPER [Ref . I:ppl69-180]
.
3. Determine the VIPER' s vulnerability to internally and
externally detonating warheads [Ref . I:ppl83-191]
.
4. Produce a methodology to determine the VIPER'S
vulnerability to directed high energy
weapons. [Ref . I:ppl91-192]
5. Produce a case study assessing the VIPER'S suscepti-
bility. (RCS, IR radiation, etc.) [Ref . l:pp227-306]
.
6. Tie in both the overall vulnerability and suscepti-
bility assessments to produce a scenario dependent
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c.l A case study of a coin-
bat helicopter's single
hit vulnerability.

